



**Groningen
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Co-existence of carbon emissions trading exemplars

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Overview

- 1. Focus & Limits of lecture**
- 2. Main components of ETS**
- 3. Assembling components**
- 4. Concluding considerations**



Focus & Limits of lecture

Focus on Design of ETS:

> 4 main components:

- [i] Policy goals
 - [ii] Costs of compliance
 - [iii] Carbon emissions prices
 - [iv] Allocations of tradable emissions permits
-
- every component = range of options
 - assemblage of particular options = ETS exemplar

Limits

- > no survey of the vast literature
- > mainly descriptive, using graphics
- > no evaluation of ETS



Component [i] Two major policy goals for EU ETS

A-goal

= Atmospheric stability and cleanness

> emitting (industrial) activities

> carbon emissions down 80-95%

> by the nearest date (before 2050)

+ induce disruptive innovations

++ higher carbon emissions prices as inducing force

II-goal

= maintain/expand EU's industrial activities

> businesses, employment

>> profits

+ avoid 'carbon leakage'


++ no € burdens on Energy-Intensive Trade-Exposed (EITE) industries

Are the two goals reconcilable?




Price €/ton
carbon
emitted

Component [ii] Costs of compliance (abatement, mitigation of carbon emissions)






Innovations in compliance, induced by high Carbon prices, shift cost curves and reduce optimal Intensities






Without inducing carbon prices: autonomous innovations (ceteris paribus, other innovation drivers excluded)




Component [iii] Carbon emissions pricing






Carbon price 'optimal' path = stair-way





Carbon price stairs evolving over time (specific outcomes depend on start year, height & gradient)

Carbon price
(€/ton emitted)



2020

...

2035

...

2050

...

timeline

Component [iv] Allocation of tradable emissions permits

ETS is a levies-permits hybrid $\leadsto$ permits allocation

LEVIES

- Yearly auctioning of shrinking year quota
- Auctioning of quota for a trade period of a few years
- Auctions spread over years, following the demand for permits
- Partial auctioning, partial free gifts
- Assign permits to the principle $MAC_i = \lambda$
- Assigning expected BAT emissions
- Grandfathering

PERMITS

[i] Goals of EU policy

Atmosphere A-goal:
all industrial activities
without carbon
emissions (by 2050?)

[ii] Costs of Compliance

Innovation of products,
services, technologies



[iii] Carbon emissions
Prices

Carbon emissions
price stair

[iv] Allocations of tradable
emissions permits

Levies-permits hybrid
≈ permit allocation

Induced
Innovation



Autonomous
Innovation

Profit π -goal:
maintain, expand
EU's industrial
activities, business,
employment

Antw

No leakage
by
carbon price

carbon
price stair
is not
climbed

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PERMITS

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

[iii] Carbon emissions
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**Carbon emissions
price stair**

[iv] Allocations of tradable
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**Levies-permits hybrid
≈ permit allocation**

**Induced
Innovation**



**Autonomous
Innovation**

**Conflicting
goals.
Not attainable
both with one
instrument**

Profit π -goal:
maintain, expand
EU's industrial
activities, business,
employment

Antw

**No leakage
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**carbon
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LEVIES

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PERMITS



Concluding Considerations

- . ETS exemplars depend on assembled selection of component options
- . Conflicting goals require different exemplars
- . EU ETS successful in protecting (serving) EU's large industries interests
- . High-price [*with high-cost for industry*] EU ETS exemplar is unlikely [*the more sticky MACs are*]